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Abstract
For two centuries, collaborative research has become increasingly
widespread. Various explanations of this trend have been proposed.
Here, we offer a novel functional explanation of it. It differs from ac-
counts like that of Wray (2002) by the precise socio-epistemic mech-
anism that grounds the beneficialness of collaboration. Boyer-Kassem
and Imbert (2015) show how minor differences in the step-efficiency of
collaborative groups can make them much more successful in particular
configurations. We investigate this model further, derive robust social
patterns concerning the general successfulness of collaborative groups,
and argue that these patterns can be used to defend a general functional
account.
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1 Introduction
For two centuries, co-authoring papers has become increasingly widespread
in academia (Price, 1963, Beaver and Rosen, 1979), especially in the last few
decades. Since the 1950s, the percentage of co-authored papers has grown at
a common rhythm for science and engineering, social sciences, and patents;
the mean size of collaborative teams has also increased, and even more so in
science and engineering. No such increase is visible for the art and humanities
(Wuchty et alii, 2007).
Various explanations of this collaborative trend have been proposed: for
example, it may be caused by scientific specialization, it may increase the
productivity or reliability of researchers, or be promoted by the rules of credit
attribution. Here, we aim at offering a new functional explanation of this trend
by showing that collaboration exists because it increases the successfulness of
scientists. The present explanation differs from accounts like that of Wray
(2002) by the social and epistemic mechanism that grounds the beneficialness
of collaboration. We analyze further an existing model that shows how minor
differences in the step-efficiency of collaborative groups at passing the steps
of a project can make them much more successful in particular configurations
(Boyer-Kassem and Imbert, 2015) and show how it can be used to build a
general and robust functional explanation of collaboration.
We introduce the model in section 2. After presenting functional explana-
tions (section 3), we show how the model can be used to derive robust social
patterns of the successfulness of collaborative groups (section 4), and argue
that these patterns can refine and strengthen functional explanations of col-
laboration like the one defended by Wray (sections 5 and 6).
2 Boyer-Kassem and Imbert’s Model: Main
Results and Explanatory Lacunas
Boyer-Kassem and Imbert (2015) investigate a model in which n agents
struggle over the completion of a research project composed of l sequential
steps. At each time interval, agents have independent probabilities p of pass-
ing a step. When an agent reaches the end of the project, she wins all the
scientific credit and the race stops (this is the priority rule). Agents can orga-
nize themselves into collaborative groups for the whole project, meaning that
they only share information, i.e. step discoveries — clearly, there are more
favorable hypotheses associated with collaborating, like having new ideas or
double-checking (see below). Within a group, agents make progress together,
and equally share final rewards. Thus, a group of k agents (hereafter k-group)
passes a step with probability pg(k, p) = 1− (1− p)k. In forthcoming illustra-
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tions, the value of l is set to 10 and that of p to 0.5, which is not particularly
favorable for groups (ibidem, 674). If collaboration is beneficial with these
hypotheses, it will be even more so with more favorable or realistic ones. A
community of n agents (hereafter, n-community) can be organized in various
k-groups. For example, a 3-community can correspond to configurations (1-1-
1), (2-1) or (3). The individual successfulness of an agent in a k-group in a
particular configuration is defined as the average individual reward divided by
time. It has been obtained for all configurations up to n = 10, on millions of
runs.
Note that this model is not aimed at quantifying the actual successful-
ness of collaborative agents, but at analyzing the differential successfulness of
agents depending on their collaborative behavior. The main finding is that
minor differences in the efficiency at passing steps can be much amplified and
that, even with not-so-favorable hypotheses, collaboration can be extremely
beneficial for scientists. For example, in a (5-4) (resp. (2-1)) configuration,
whereas the difference in step efficiency between the 5 (resp. 2) and the 4-
group (resp. 1-group) is 3% (resp. 50%), the difference in individual success-
fulness is 25% (resp. 700%). The scope of these results actually goes beyond
the initial hypotheses in terms of information sharing. Formally speaking, the
model is a race between (collective) agents i with probabilities pi of passing
steps. Whatever the origin of the differences in pi, they are greatly amplified
by the sequential race. In other words, any factor, whether epistemic or not,
that implies an increase in pi of a k-group (e.g. if a collaborator is an expert
concerning specific steps, if increased resources improve step-efficiency, etc.)
makes this group as successful as a larger group — hence the generality of this
mechanism.
Still, these results do not explain scientific collaboration by themselves.
First, collaboration is beneficial for particular k-groups in particular configu-
rations only: a 2-group is very successful in configuration (2-1-1-1-1) but not in
(7-2). Thus, the model mostly provides possibility results about what can be
the case in certain configurations. Second, the explanandum is a general social
feature of modern science, not some collaborative behavior in some particu-
lar case, so the explanans must also involve general statements about the link
between collaboration and beneficialness. Then, if the model presents generic
social mechanisms with explanatory import, one needs to describe at a general
level the effects of these mechanisms and provide some general, invariant pat-
tern between collaboration and beneficialness. This is what we do in section 4.
A final serious worry is that the beneficialness of a state by no means explains
why it exists, nor perseveres in being. A link needs to be made between the
beneficialness of collaboration and its existence over time. We suggest that
this connection can be accounted for functionally.
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3 Functional Explanations and Collaboration
We review in this section how functional explanations work and how they
can be used in the present case. We follow Wray’s choice to use Kincaid’s ac-
count because it is simple, widely accepted, and that nothing substantial hinges
on this choice. Functional explanations explain the existence of a feature by
one of its effects, usually its usefulness or beneficialness. As such, they can
be sloppy and badly flawed. The usefulness of the nose to carry glasses does
not explain that humans have one. Nevertheless, if stringent conditions are
met, it is usually considered that functional explanations can be satisfactory,
typically within biology. Even Elster, who otherwise favors methodological in-
dividualism, agrees that functional explanations can be acceptable in the social
science (Elster, 1983). According to Kincaid (1996, 105-114), P is functionally
explained by E, i.e. P exists ”in order to promote <effect E>” if:
(1) P causes E,
(2) P persists because it causes E,
(3) P is causally prior to E.
Then, a functional explanation of collaboration should have the following
form:
(1c) Scientists’ collaborative behavior causes the increase of their individual
successfulness.
(2c) Scientists’ collaborative behavior persists (or develops) because it causes
a higher individual successfulness.
(3c) Collaborative behavior is causally prior to this increased individual suc-
cessfulness that is rooted in collaborative behavior.
We agree with Wray (2002, 161) that it is implausible to consider that the
high successfulness of scientists is the initial cause of collaboration since many
scientists have been successful (and continue to be in some fields) without
collaborating. In the same time, there can be various contingent reasons why
some researchers have decided to engage in some collaboration. So, what calls
for an explanation is the fact that collaboration is widespread and persistent,
not its occasional existence.
4 Collaboration Causes Successfulness
We now argue that the above model provides strong evidence in favor of
(1c). To explain the general collaborative patterns described above, the causal
4
relation between collaboration and successfulness needs to be general and ro-
bust. Hence, one needs to go beyond the description of the beneficialness of
collaboration in particular situations. A first route is to find general results
about when it is beneficial for individuals to collaborate, such as the following
theorem (see the appendix for the proof).
Theorem. When m groups of equal size k merge, the individual success-
fulness of agents increases.
In other words, as soon as several k-groups of the same size exist, they
would improve the individual successfulness of their members by merging. A
corollary is that single individuals always have interest in collaborating. How-
ever, this theorem only covers a small subset of possible configurations, and
cannot provide a general vindication for the causality claim (1c). Further,
agents might only use it if they are aware of it and are in a position to identify
groups of equal-size competitors, which cannot be assumed in general.
To overcome these difficulties, we now assess agents’ successfulness irre-
spective of what they know about other competitors: we consider the average
successfulness of k-groups over all possible configurations for each community
size. For example, we average the individual successfulness of 4-groups in con-
figurations (4-1-1-1); (4-2-1) and (4-3)1. In order to study the robustness of the
causal relation between collaboration and successfulness, we investigate in the
next paragraphs how much collaborating remains beneficial under variations
of key parameters of the competition context.
Successfulness and community size. Figure 1 shows the average suc-
cessfulness within k-groups for communities of various sizes. First, the suc-
cessfulness of loners brutally collapses and is much lower than that of other k-
groups as soon as n > 2. This confirms that except when nobody collaborates,
or in very small communities, loners are outraced. Second, for all group sizes,
individual successfulness decreases for larger communities, as can be expected
when the number of competing groups and their size increases. Nevertheless,
the successfulness of k-groups remains high and stable up to some commu-
nity size s larger than k till they are eventually outperformed by larger groups
or till growing bigger would mean over-collaborating (see (Boyer-Kassem and
Imbert, 2015, 679-80) for an analysis of over-collaboration in large groups).
Third, the larger the groups are, the longer and flatter this initial plate of
successfulness is and the less steep the decrease in successfulness is. Fourth,
1There is no clear rationale about how to weigh configurations. From a combinatorial
viewpoint, configuration (1,1,1,1,1,1,1) has one realization and (3,2,1,1) several ones. But
from an empirical viewpoint, when scientists hardly collaborate, configuration (1,1,1,1,1,1,1)
is usual and (3,2,1,1) extremely rare. We have privileged simplicity and chosen to give equal
weight to all configurations.
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when n is much larger than k, the successfulness of k-groups increases with k.
However, this increase is a moderate one and small groups still do reasonably
well, which is somewhat unexpected, given the general amplification effect —
but see the analysis of figure 3 below for more refined analyses. Typically,
in 10-communities, 2-groups do badly but remain somewhat viable since their
average successfulness remains between 1/3 to 1/2 of that of 3 or 4-groups.
Overall, not collaborating is in general not a viable strategy. Collaborating
moderately (k = 2 or 3) can be very rewarding when there are few competitors
(e.g. in small research communities, or on ground-breaking questions that are
only known to a handful of scientits). Smalls groups remain viable but tend
to be outraced when communities become significantly larger (typically, con-
cerning questions belonging to normal science that many researchers are likely
to tackle). Thus, moderately collaborating is a viable but more risky strategy
when uncertainty prevails about the number and size of competing groups. Fi-
nally, while large collaborative groups rarely get exceptionally high gains, they
are extremely safe, with moderate differences in successfulness between them
or when the community size increases.
Successfulness and group size. Figure 2 shows the variation of indi-
vidual successfulness with group size for various community sizes. First, for
n > 2, the successfulness curve has a one-peaked (discrete) form, the maximum
of which grows with the community size. Second, these one-peaked curves are
not symmetric: the increase in successfulness is steep (but less so for larger
groups), the decrease is gradual (idem). Large groups predate resources so
groups need to grow big quickly to get some share and because returns can
be increasing (Boyer-Kassem and Imbert 2015, 678), the increase in success-
fulness is steep. The decrease after the peak is slow because large group are
hard to predate but over-collaborating can become suboptimal when the in-
crease in gain by predation no longer makes up for the need to share between
more people). These results are not trivial because at the configuration level,
the successfulness of groups is contextual. They are important, too. A one-
peaked profile is usually assumed in the literature about coalitions. Here, it
emerges from a micro-model, and gets its justification from it. Overall, these
patterns show again that agents have a large incentive to collaborate substan-
tially, whatever the competing environment.
Successfulness in more or less collaborative communities. Figure 3
finally shows how the successfulness of k-group members varies with the degree
of collaboration in their competition environment.2 Here again, what matters
2Here, the degree of collaboration in each configuration is assessed by computing the
average size of k-groups. For each k, we then compute the average successfulness of a
member of a k-group over configurations having a degree of collaboration within intervals
[1, 1.5] (represented at coordinate “1.25” on the x-axis), [1.25, 1.75], [1.5, 2] ... [3.5, 4]. We
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Figure 1: Variation of individual suc-
cessfulness with community size.
Figure 2: Variation of individual suc-
cessfulness with the size of groups.
Figure 3: Variation of successfulness with the degree of collaboration in com-
munities.
is less the exact value of the successfulness than the differential successfulness
between more or less collaborating individuals. The graph confirms that suc-
cessfulness depends less on the absolute size of groups than on how much they
collaborate in comparison with their competitors. Scientists who collaborate
more than average are very successful; those who collaborate as their peers
do reasonably well; those that collaborate less than average are outraced by a
large margin. This general result is not unexpected given all the above results,
but the graph highlights that success for intensively collaborating scientists,
and underachievement for under-collaborators can be very large. This is an
important finding because if, as we shall see, successful scientists pass over
their collaborative habits more than their peers, then the feedback loop pro-
vides a mechanism that favors the increase of the degree of collaboration by
promoting those that collaborate more than others.
have chosen overlapping intervals to smoothen results. The average is computed up to
communities of size 10.
7
Partial conclusion. Overall, the results show that — everything else
being equal — collaborating a lot entails successfulness. This relation is ro-
bust under changes in the size of communities or in the exact size of groups.
Further, those who collaborate more than average are much more successful.
Collaborating too much is not a significant problem, under-collaborating is.
So, collaborating a lot is a safe working habit, especially in the absence of
information about the size and structure of the competing community. In light
of this evidence, (1c) seems adequately supported.
5 Collaborative Practices Develop Because of
the Success of Collaborative Scientists
We have so far argued that collaborative scientists, especially when they
collaborate more than others, are more successful. We now need to argue
that, because of this differential successfulness, collaborative habits persist
and possibly develop in scientific communities (2c). A wide variety of social
mechanisms across scientific contexts can contribute to this feedback loop.
Accordingly, we shall be content with giving various evidence that strongly
suggests that this link is a likely one.
Transmission. Knowing how and when to collaborate is not straightfor-
ward. Like other know-how skills, it can be developed by exercising it with
people who already possess the relevant procedural knowledge. In this case,
people who already collaborate can endorse this role of cultural transmission for
colleagues and above all students (Thagard, 2006). Working with students is
an efficient way to train them as scientists (Thagard, 1997, 248—50), so scien-
tists have incentives to enroll students in their collaborative groups. Then, the
cultural transmission of collaborative practice does not require any particular
effort on top of that. The very circumstances that make collaboration possi-
ble and beneficial also make its transmission easier: when a research project
can be divided into well-defined tasks, the solutions of which can be publicly
assessed and shared, it is easier to enroll other people and thereby transmit
collaborative skills to them (ibidem). Thus, collaborative habits can be passed
over and need not be reinvented by newcomers.
Transmission opportunities. We now argue that collaborative scien-
tists, because they are more successful, will more often be in a position to
transmit their collaborative habits and that the collaboration rate will there-
fore increase. Within applied science, in which collaboration is also widespread
(Wuchty, 2007), research projects are usually directed at finding profitable
applications, which can be patented. Thus, fund providers are directly and
strongly interested in hiring and providing resource to successful scientists,
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who develop such applications. Within pure science, the connection is less
straightforward. But because scientific success is the official goal of science,
successful scientists can be expected to stand better chances to get good posi-
tions and grants, develop research programs, and pass over their collaborative
habits.
Note that it is merely needed that the function between the pragmatic re-
wards of scientists and their success is on average increasing. This remains
compatible with the fact that some epistemically successful scientists get little
resource and some unsuccessful scientists get a lot — which seems to be the
case. Actually, non-epistemic factors may even tend to over-credit successful
scientists, and in particular collaborative ones. First, individual successfulness
has been assessed in the model with a conservative estimate. It seems that
an agent’s publication within a k-group is actually more appreciated than just
1/k of a single-authored publication. For instance, a large French research
institution in medicine officially weighs the citations of a paper with “a factor
1 for first or last author, 0.5 for second or next to last, and 0.25 for all others”
(Inserm 2005). Also, a publication within a 10-group will generally be more
visible than one single-authored publication, since more people can promote
or publicize collective publications and research topics. Second, sociology of
science seems to indicate that scientific credit tends to accrue to a subset of sci-
entists who are perceived as extremely successful — this is the Matthew effect
(Merton, 1968). Then, to the extent that access to resources increases with
scientific credit, successful collaborative scientists can be expected to benefit
from this effect and transmit more their working habits. The concentration
of credit and resource may further stimulate collaborative behavior with these
fortunate scientists.
Other types of mechanisms may contribute to this process, like conscious
ones. So far, agents have only been supposed to follow their working habits
and sometimes transmit them. But supplementary intentional or imitative pro-
cesses may also feed this dynamics 3. Once winners of the scientific race publish
co-authored articles, it becomes easy for others to see that successful scientists
are highly collaborative ones. (For instance, if agents of a 3-group are 4 times
more successful than a single agent, this means that their groups publishes
12 more articles than this agent). Accordingly, the belief that collaborating
is beneficial can be acquired as collaborating becomes usual. Furthermore,
resources may accrue to scientific institutions that host individually success-
ful scientists, and indirectly to these scientists. Agents in the model can be
reinterpreted as teams or collective entities which decide to share results or to
combine their expertise to produce collective articles. Then, these institutions
3Kincaid mentions that “complex combinations of intentional action, unintended conse-
quences of intentional action, and differential survival of social practices might likewise make
these conditions [(1)–(3) in our Section 3] true” (Kincaid 1996, 112).
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and their members will be more successful, may attract resource, and will keep
developing and transmitting their working habits.
In light of the above discussion, we believe that the causal connection be-
tween the success of collaborative scientists and the persistence and develop-
ment of collaborative practices is highly plausible.
6 Discussion
Good functional explanations should be unambiguous about when the causal
mechanisms that they rely on are efficient. In the present case, the following
conditions can be emphasized.
First, conditions for the application of the priority rule should be met. In
particular, (i) it should be possible to single out problems and to state uncon-
troversially when they are solved. Second, for the model to apply, (ii) scientific
problems should be dividable into subtasks, and (iii) the solutions of these
subtasks should be communicable. Finally, the model assumes that (iv) the
completion of these subtasks should be sequential, but our conclusions still hold
if this condition is relaxed. Indeed, if some subtasks can be tackled in parallel
then the project can be completed even more quickly by different agents of a
group, and collaboration is even more successful. Conditions (i)-(iii) are some-
what met in the formal and empirical sciences, less so in the social science, and
almost not in the humanities. For example, as noted by Thagard (1997, 249),
the humanities do not obviously lend themselves to the division of labor and to
teacher/apprentice collaborations. Similarly, the importance of interpretative
methods and the coexistence of incompatible traditions may prevent consensus
on the nature of significant problems and what counts as a solution. This may
account for the differences concerning collaborative patterns in these fields.
As mentioned above, different causal pathways may connect the success-
fulness of collaborative scientists to the persistence and development of col-
laborative practices. Thus, conditions for the fulfillment of claim (2c) cannot
be uniquely specified. But several points are worth mentioning. First, the
activity of epistemically successful scientists should be favored by scientific in-
stitutions. This can be the case if it is agreed that scientific success, in the
form of publications or patents, is valued and promoted. Concerning scientific
results that lead to patents, applications and financial gains, this condition is
met when public or private funders value such outputs. Concerning pure sci-
entific results, this means that there should be a wide agreement about which
results are scientifically good and significant, and there should exist common
and accessible publication venues, the value of which is consensual. Again,
these conditions are approximately met in the formal and empirical sciences,
less so in the social science and, almost not in the humanities in which scholars
do not share paradigms, methods or norms about what is scientifically sound
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and significant, and cultural and linguistic barriers can restrain the existence
of unified communities and common publication venues. Second, in contexts
in which researchers and projects are regularly evaluated, especially by agents
or institutions who are not in a position to asses the scientific value of their
work, the existence of a common standard of success in terms of publications
(through simple and calibrated publication indicators) may even more favor
researchers who are successful, and therefore the development of collaboration.
Finally, when resources are crucial to carry out or facilitate research, snowball
effects can favor even more successful scientists, and in particular collaborative
ones. This resource accessibility condition, which is central in Wray’s explana-
tion, is not in ours. But we agree that in such cases, the functional mechanisms
that we describe will be even stronger. In this sense, our account encompasses
Wray’s. This condition about resources may be another reason for the differ-
ence in collaborative behavior between the formal or empirical sciences, the
social sciences and the humanities.
7 Conclusion
We have argued that collaborating a lot is overall a safe and success-
conducing practice. This conclusion is robust for various sizes of groups,
communities and degrees of collaboration; everything being equal, those who
collaborate more than average do better. Then, to the extent that the success-
fulness of researchers gives them more opportunities to transmit their research
habits, the development of collaborative practices in communities can be func-
tionally explained. We have further emphasized that the conditions for this
functional pattern to work are specifically met in the scientific fields in which
collaboration is well-developed. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to consider
that this functional mechanism is an important element of the explanation of
the development of collaboration in modern science.
The explanation of collaboration is probably a multi-factorial issue. Never-
theless, an asset of our general functional explanation is that it highlights the
unexpected force of beneficial aspects of collaborative activities and suggests
important roles for contextual factors that are associated with the rise of col-
laboration. As such, it is general and unifying. For instance, the competition
model shows how the division of scientific labor, the use of specialized experts
(Muldoon 2017), or the increased reliability of collaborative teams (Fallis 2006,
200) can increase the probability that groups pass research steps and have am-
plified effects in terms of successfulness. Similarly, factors like the need to
access resources to carry out or facilitate research can create a snowball effect
that favors epistemically successful (collaborative) researchers (Wray 2002).
And factors like the globalization of research or professionalization (Beaver,
1979) can be seen as conditions favoring the application of the priority rule
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and scientific competition.
Finally, while nothing in the model provides an internal limit to the growth
of collaboration, one can note that there is a wealth of reasons why collabo-
rating groups cannot develop forever. For example, communities are limited
in size, spatially distributed, and collaboration is all the more costly as groups
are large. The model could be easily modified to integrate factors that limit
the success and development of collaboration.
8 Appendix: Proof of the Theorem
Consider first the simple case where the m k-groups don’t have other com-
petitors. By symmetry, all groups have the same probability 1/m to win the
race and get the reward — call this reward r. So, the individual expected
reward is r/(km). Suppose now the groups merge and all km agents collabo-
rate. Each of them will receive the same reward, so their expected individual
rewards are r/(km) too. However, what matters in the model is not the ex-
pected reward, but the successfulness, which is this quantity divided by time.
Because within a collaboration agents share all the steps they pass, the larger
km-group will be at least as quick, and sometimes more, than all k-groups —
more precisely: for a given drawing of all random variables corresponding to
attempts to pass the steps, for all agents and temporal intervals, the km-group
will move at least as quickly as all k-groups. So the individual successfulness
is at least as high when identical groups merge.
Consider now the case where there are other competitors than the m groups.
For a given drawing of all random variables, either the winner is one of the m
groups, or another competitor. In the former case, the above reasoning can be
made again, and the same conclusion holds. In the latter case, there is nothing
to lose, and because the km-group is sometimes quicker than the m k-groups,
there can be additional cases where it outcompetes the other competitors; then,
the individual successfulness increases with the merging. QED.
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